We study the role played by the informal links, or "connections", between the CEO and the divisional managers of conglomerate organizations. Using data on a large sample of multi-segment US corporations from 1996 to 2004, we show that segments run by connected managers receive more investment and exhibit lower sensitivity to cash flow short-falls (and exhibit higher sensitivity to other segments' cash-flow). At the firm-level, having more connected managers presiding over high Q segments improves resource allocation and increases firm value. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the mutual trust associated with connections reduces the need for wasteful reallocation of resources across divisions of conglomerate firms.
I. Introduction
Budgeting investment resources in multi-segment firms is a complex and lengthy negotiation process between corporate headquarters and operating divisions. This process, in which the company's CEO plays the role of arbiter, determines the overall investment policy of the firm. Investment is therefore at least partially dependent on the relationship between each divisional manager and his CEO. 1 This paper studies the role played by the existence of commonalities between the CEO and divisional managers on the resource allocation process within the firm. We construct an index of the informal links, or "connections", that relate people that belong to the same organization. We collect data on whether the CEO and the divisional managers share the same career (they have the same area of expertise, say marketing) or educational background (they attended the same university), are in the same age group, or are affiliated with the same generation inside the firm (they joined the firm or were appointed to their current position at around the same time).
We argue that sharing these characteristics makes it more likely that the CEO and the divisional managers share similar beliefs and interpret the same piece of information in a similar way (e.g. Boot and Thakor (2004) ). Moreover, managers with common backgrounds, that met at the time of joining the firm or that belong to the same circle of influence, are more likely to stay in touch and share information about their activities. Both elements -the "thinking alike" factor and the direct personal interactionconcur to create trust between the CEO and the divisional managers.
At the same time, it is also possible that connections are a sign that the CEO and a divisional manager belong to the same power group within the firm. They make more likely that both CEO and the divisional manager belong to an "old boys" network and share vested interests. In this view, connections would be associated with the ability of the divisional manager to lobby the CEO for resources (e.g. Wulf (2005) ).
We therefore compare two hypotheses concerning the role of connections: a "trust hypothesis" and a "bargaining hypothesis".
The trust hypothesis relies on the Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) model. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) argue that managers of divisions with good investment opportunities might purposefully choose to shirk in order to prevent ex-post poaching by less-productive divisions. To minimize the extent of value destruction, the CEO misallocates investment resources ex-ante in the direction of less prospects. This result should be more pronounced in the case of firms with highly diverse divisions in terms of investment opportunities. 4 We test these hypotheses, against a null hypothesis of no impact of connections in the working of the internal capital market, using a large sample of multi-segment U.S. corporations from 1996 to 2004.
We collect information on the cohort the CEOs and the divisional managers belong to in terms of: age; time they got appointed to their current position; time they joined the company; similar type of career background (e.g. finance, marketing, or engineering backgrounds), and similar education (attended the same university or have an MBA degree). We use this information to construct an index of commonality between CEO and divisional managers and define managers that share many characteristics with the CEO as "connected".
We find that connected divisional managers get allocated more resources. Our parameter estimates show that a one-standard deviation increase in the connection index implies a 4.4% increase in the segment's investment, relative to the average segment. We also show that this increased allocation is associated with a lower sensitivity to cash-flow shortfalls, as well as a higher sensitivity to the cashflows of other segments of the firm, particularly in times when the segment is underperforming.
Although segment-level results do not allow us to distinguish between the trust and the bargaining hypothesis, they show that connections do play a role in the resource allocation, rejecting the null hypothesis of no influence of commonality.
At the firm level, and in the spirit of Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) , we construct a measure that captures how much the more productive segments of the firm and the less productive ones differ in terms of the commonality of their managers with the CEO: the "CONNECTION GAP". The CONNECTION GAP is the difference in the connection index between segments with higher investment opportunities and segments with lower investment opportunities. We show that transfers to the segments with lower investment opportunities are lower when the managers in segments with good investment opportunities display a higher index of connection.
Using the CONNECTION GAP, we find that the firm's excess value (i.e., the difference between the firm's Tobin's Q and the firm's imputed Q derived from Qs of single-segment firms) is positively related to the difference in connection between the more productive segments of the firm and the less 4 Although Scharfstein and Stein (2000) do not use the term 'diversity', they state: "our results... require more than just the existence of low [productivity] and rent-seeking per se -they require a pronounced imbalance between the productivity of the two divisions" (page 2552).
productive ones. An increase of one standard deviation in CONNECTION GAP corresponds to a 2.3% absolute decrease in the average conglomerate discount, equivalent to a 13% percent decrease. We show that this impact is particularly strong in the case of very diverse firms. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that connections proxy for trust between CEO and divisional managers and help reducing the negative effects of the misallocation of resources. It is also worth mentioning that in all our analysis we control for the average ability of divisional managers, and also for the existence of intra-segment commonalities across division managers.
One issue we face is that the existence of connections might be endogenously related to resource allocation and performance. If the CEO chooses to appoint connected managers to the helm of the best and/or bigger segments, connection would be a function of performance and not the other way around.
To address this issue, we use an instrumental variable (IV) technique, selecting as instruments the climate characteristics of the localities where the segments are located. We argue that weather affects the attractiveness of a particular location to a manager while being at the same time uncorrelated with segment performance. This exercise results in economically and statistically similar estimates.
Our findings relate to different streams of research. We directly relate to the literature on internal capital markets, which has shown an association between inefficient resource allocations in conglomerates and lower firm value. 5 Among the theories put forward to explain this result, firm-level theories focus on the existence of private benefits of control and/or manager's aversion to idiosyncratic risk. 6 Division-level theories focus on wasteful lobbying or influence activities from rent-seeking managers (Meyer, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) , Scharfstein and Stein (2000) , Wulf (2005) ), or the exante incentive effects from ex-post bargaining (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) ). We contribute to this literature by showing how trust-inducing commonality influences the operation of internal capital markets.
Our work is also related to the growing literatures on the role of manager specific characteristics on firm value and investment (Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , Malmendier and Tate (2005a) , Malmendier and Tate (2005b) , Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2007) ), the impact of social networks and diversity in the 5 See among others Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , Lamont (1997) , Shin and Stulz (1998) , Khanna and Tice (2001) , Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) , and Lamont and Polk (2002) . This result is not consensual and has been strongly called into question, due to econometric problems (e.g. Whited (2001) , Campa and Kedia (2002) Villalonga (2004a) ), data issues (e.g. Villalonga (2004b) ), and differences in productivity (Maksimovic and Philips (2002) ), valuation (Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002) ) and capital structure (Mansi and Reeb (2002) ) between single-segment and multi-segment firms. 6 See among others Jensen (1986) , Stulz (1990) , Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) , Matsusaka and Nanda (1997) , Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) , and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) .
board (Adams and Ferreira (2004) , Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), Landier, Thesmar and Sraer (2005) , Subrahmanyam (2006) ), and the impact of connections and trust among economic agents affect investment behavior (e.g., Kuhnen (2005) , Xuan (2006) , Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2007) , Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) ).
The papers closer to ours are the ones by McNeil and Smythe (2009) They also show that diversity in lobbying power across division is negatively correlated with firm value.
Glaser, Lopez-de-Silanes and Sautner (2009) use data from one large German conglomerate organization to provide evidence on how measures of managerial bargaining power affect the allocation of capital. They find that ex-ante capital allocations do not depend on manager lobbying, but unexpected windfalls do. While similar in spirit, the focus of our paper is different. Both papers mentioned focus on manager characteristics correlated with bargaining power, while our paper looks at characteristics that are common to both divisional managers and the CEO. This different focus allows us to test the differential effect of connections as a trust mechanism versus connections as an influence mechanism.
Moreover, our results complement both papers, since we choose to investigate a very large set of U.S.
firms tracked over a relatively long period.
The remainder of the paper is articulated as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and the way we constructed our proxies for connection. Section 3 reports the segment-level findings about the relation between connection and investment, as well as the impact of connections on the sensitivity of investment to cash-flow. Section 4 looks at the firm-level allocation of resources between high-Q and low-Q segments and their implications in terms of the conglomerate discount. Section 5 addresses the issue of endogeneity. A brief conclusion follows.
II. Data description

A. Sample Construction
Our primary data sources are the annual CRSP-Compustat Merged files (containing firm-level accounting data) and the Compustat Segment files (containing segment assets, investment and cash-flow data). We keep in the sample multiple-segment firms that have non-missing segment SIC codes, CRSP share codes equal to 10 or 11, positive values for book equity and sales higher or equal to 20 million USD (Berger and Ofek, 1995) . We remove firms whose sum of segment sales is more than 1 percent away from total firm sales reported in Compustat, as well as financial companies and utilities (Berger and Ofek, 1995) . After winsorizing all variables at the 1% level, a total of 43,090 segment-year observations remain.
We proceed to add biographical data on company managers, as follows. First, we obtain information on the subsidiaries of each company through Dun & Bradstreet's (D&B) Million Dollar
Database. This data source contains information on the identity of each subsidiary, its position in the corporate structure, its number of employees, its SIC code and its location. 7 We then create an algorithm that allocates company subsidiaries to each Compustat segment. The algorithm allocates subsidiaries first by matching the segment's SIC code and secondly (on the basis of a text-matching score) by matching the business description of both the segment and subsidiary. The algorithm finds matching subsidiaries for 47% (60%) of the total number (asset value) of Compustat segments.
Second, we collect biographical information on each company's CEO and middle-managers, also using D&B as the source. The data contains information on the year of birth, year of joining the company, and date of current appointment for about 31,959 middle managers and CEOs working in D&B identified subsidiaries. We also use keywords to parse each manager's biography in search of his career and educational background (see below). Once this data is merged with Compustat, we are left with CEO biographical information for 23,465 segment-years and middle-manager age information for 16,982 observations.
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The final sample results in 10,459 segment-years that have non-missing values for our main variables: beginning-of-year segment assets and sales, firm beginning-of-year assets, market capitalization, segment investment, Tobin's Q, firm age, DIVERSITY (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) ) and CONNECTION (defined below). A detailed description of the merge of the datasets and the statistics comparing our final sample with the Compustat base sample are reported in the Appendix.
B. Proxies For Connection
The final sample contains biographical profiles on the company's CEO and the middle-level managers working in every subsidiary ("divisional managers"). We construct proxies for connection by 7 D&B also contains some accounting information on subsidiaries, but it is to be too sparse for effective use.
8 These figures refer to the cases where we are able to identify the age and time of joining of at least one manager of one subsidiary belonging to a given segment.
conducting pairwise comparisons between the CEO's profile and the divisional managers' profiles as follows. Each pairwise comparison consists of creating a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if a certain characteristic is common to both the CEO and a divisional manager and zero otherwise. The 4 characteristics are: (i) whether the CEO and the divisional manager joined the company at around the same time (defined as entering the firm within 2 years of each other); (ii) if they belong to the same age cohort (defined as being born within 4 years of each other); (iii) if they attained their current position at around the same time (defined as 2 years of each other); (iv) and if they share the same career and educational background. The latter comparison is made by finding in each biography common keywords (e.g. Malmendier and Tate (2005) ): regarding career background, we use the keywords "Finance", "Marketing", and "Engineering", and we also check if CEO and manager were both employed by another company in the past; regarding education, we check if CEO and manager attended the same university and if they both have an MBA. where N j is the number of segments belonging to firm j. We do this to accommodate the possibility that some firms are by nature of their business more connected than others.
10 Henceforth, we use CONNECTION as shorthand for 'net' CONNECTION, unless specified otherwise.
C. Other Variables
We employ as control for alternative hypotheses the set of other variables used in previous papers.
We refer to the caption of Table 1 normalized by the beginning-of-period total assets A j . We also employ the percentage of segment assets relative to total firm assets (WEIGHT OF SEGMENT) and a measure of the resources reallocated by the internal capital market to a given segment (TRANSFER), defined (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)) as: where N j is now shorthand for the set of segments belonging to firm j, A i,j represents segment-level assets, and w i,j is the weight of segment i on firm j's total assets.
Concerning firm-level variables, the ones most worth mentioning are: the percentage growth in firm sales in the past year (SALES GROWTH), the firm's number of business lines reported in Compustat segment data (NUMBER OF SEGMENTS), the ratio between market value and book value 10 The formula for excess CONNECTION attributes equal weight to every segment in the firm in calculating the firm-level CONNECTION. Results using value weights (segment's assets or sales) are similar and available upon request. of assets (TOBIN'S Q, defined as in Villalonga, 2004 ) and a measure of diversity in investment opportunities between segments (DIVERSITY), defined (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) The difference between the firm's Q and the IMPUTED Q captures the diversification discount.
We call it EXCESS VALUE. Since one of our objectives is to see how the existence of connections affects the investment allocation process depending on the relative attractiveness of segments, we define a high (low) attractiveness segment -or "High Q" ("Low Q") segment for short -a segment that is above (below) the firm's imputed Q. We then compute the HIGH (LOW) Q SEGMENT CONNECTION variable as the average CONNECTION of the firm's High (Low) Q segments. This is akin to the way total transfers to High and Low segments are calculated in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) . 13 For clarity, Table 1 presents all values for TRANSFER multiplied by 100, just as Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) .
reported by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) . The average (median) FIRM AGE is 22 (17) years, revealing that firms in our sample are rather mature, established firms. common connection is to belong to the same age cohort (18%), followed by similar time of appointment (15%) and by similar time of joining (15%). The data in the Table also reports that each segment has on average 2.3 subsidiaries and a total of 8.4 managers in those subsidiaries.
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If we look at the firm-level, we find that the average (median) CONNECTION is 14% (8%).
Interestingly, CONNECTION is not related to the attractiveness of the segments: High Q segments (which represent on average 42% of firm assets) display the same average and median levels of CONNECTION (respectively 8% and 3%) than Low Q Segments (which represent on average 45% of firm assets). 16 This is very important as it suggests that there is no systematic bias or direct relationship between the connection of the divisional managers and some firm characteristics.
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III. Connection and Segment Resource Allocation
A. Connections and Segment Investment
The first question we address is whether connections affect the way resources are allocated to individual segments. We estimate:
(1)
where RA represents two measures of resource allocation. The first is the normalized SEGMENT INVESTMENT defined above, and the second is Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales's (2000) TRANSFER 14 These values refer to 'gross' CONNECTION. The 'net' CONNECTION has zero median and negligible mean by construction, and a range between -0.6 and 0.5. 15 The latter number is the denominator over which all the CONNECTION pairings are summed. 16 "Mid" segments refers to cases where SEGMENT Q and IMPUTED Q are equal. These are firms that are "pseudoconglomerates" (Sanzhar, 2004) , that is, firms whose reported segments all belong to the same 4-digit SIC code. 17 We interpret this as indicating that connections are the "accidental" outcome of a process developing over time and can hence be treated as predetermined in econometric terms. Nevertheless, we deal explicitly with the potential endogeneity issues in section 5.
variable. The matrices X and Z refer respectively to a set of segment-level control variables and firmlevel control variables. Base-specification variables in X include SSCF, OSCF, SEGMENT Q and WEIGHT OF SEGMENT, while firm-level variables in Z include (the Log of) firm SALES and SALES GROWTH, firm AGE, DIVERSITY, IMPUTED Q, LONG-TERM DEBT, CASH and NUMBER OF SEGMENTS.
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In our regression analysis we also consider a second specification with two additional groups of variables (both specifications will be used consistently throughout the paper).
The first group consists of variables that control for the "level" of career/education backgrounds of the divisional managers. This is because our connection index might be picking up not the "link" between the CEO and the manager, but the fact that higher-ability managers will exhibit particular characteristics like having an MBA or coming from an Ivy-League school (and hence appear more connected to the CEO). In other words, we want to control for the fact that ability, and not connection, might driving our results. Hence we insert variables that count the proportion of managers with a certain type of past career (Finance, Marketing, Engineering), managers with an MBA degree, a Ph.D. degree, and the number of managers coming from an Ivy League university.
The second group consists of INTRA-MANAGER CONNECTION variables that are constructed in a similar way as the original CONNECTION variables, with the difference that the proportion is calculated over the number of possible pairs between managers of a segment (excluding the CEO). Our aim is to control for the similarity between managers of a segment. Indeed, if we observe that segments run by old managers (that have the same age as the CEO) are channeled more resources, this may be due to the fact that older divisional managers as a group have more influence over the firm's affairs, as opposed to the fact that there is a link between those managers and the CEO. By explicitly adding variables that proxy for the amount of links between divisional managers, we can control for this spurious correlation.
Finally, all specifications include firm fixed effects, industry dummies and geographical location (U.S. state) dummies.
19 Standard errors are clustered by year.
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report results concerning SEGMENT INVESTMENT, while columns 3 and 4 report results for TRANSFER. The coefficients of the control variables (SSCF, OSCF and SALES GROWTH) display signs, magnitudes and significance levels similar to the ones reported by Shin and Stulz (1998) . The exception is the variable SEGMENT Q which exhibits quite lower coefficients in all specifications. 21 The R-squared of 50% and 25% in the two models (relatively high for cross-sectional regressions) indicates a satisfactory overall fit of the model due to the use of firm, industry, and state fixed-effects.
The coefficient of the CONNECTION variable in the case of INVESTMENT (TRANSFER) is
positive, in the range of 0.012 to 0.015 (0.024 and 0.029), and statistically significant at the 1% level across the different specifications. The magnitude of the coefficient is economically meaningful: the parameter coefficients in the largest specification indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in CONNECTION implies a 4.4% increase in segment investment relative to the mean and a 7% change in transfers made available to the segment. 22 The control variables related to ability and to intra-segment connections are not significant, indicating that it is the links between the managers and the CEO that matter as opposed to the characteristics of the managers per se.
23
Which component of the CONNECTION index drives most of the results? To answer this question, Table 3 reports results using the components of CONNECTION instead of the index itself as 19 We include location dummies in all our specifications because we hypothesize (in section 5) that the amount of observed connections might be correlated with geographical location of segment subsidiaries. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 20 We cluster by year to prevent the possibility of a time effect biasing inferences. Some of the readers might wonder if clustering by firm is not necessary to have unbiased standard errors. Petersen's (2007) results show that having firm fixed effects is enough to ensure unbiased standard errors, under the assumption that the fixed effect is permanent and not temporary.
The short length of our panel makes us comfortable in assuming that the former is the case in our data. In any case, results with clustering by firm produce similar-sized standard errors. 21 One possible reason might be our different sample period and the fact that we control for firm size (log of Sales). 22 The standard deviation of EXCESS CONNECTION is 0.068. Hence a one-standard deviation increase implies a 0.015 × 0.068 = 0.102% increase in SEGMENT INVESTMENT, a 0.102%/2% = 5.1% rise relative to the average SEGMENT INVESTMENT of 2% reported in Table 1 . Analogously, a one-standard deviation increase in CONNECTION implies a 0.021 × 0.068 = 0.014% increase in TRANSFER, a 0.014%/0.2% = 7% increase relative to the average TRANSFER of 0.2% reported in Table 1 . 23 In a previous draft we also include controls for the quality of corporate governance of the firm, namely the proportion of shares held by block-holders and by institutional investors, and the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
B. Connections and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
We now investigate the degree to which connections influence the sensitivity of segment investment to cash-flow. Previous literature (e.g. Shin and Stulz, 1998) showed that investment in a given segment depends on the cash-flow generated by that segment as well as on the cash-flow made available by the other segments of the firm (the sensitivity coefficients providing evidence on how internal capital markets work). If connections affect the allocation of resources across segments, we expect that connected segments bear less the brunt of their own cash-flow shortfalls, while at the same time being on the receiving end if the rest of the firm is performing well.
To test this intuition, we estimate (2)
where investment is regressed on the segment i's cash-flow (SSCF), on the sum of all other segment's cash-flow apart from segment i (OSCF), CONNECTION (denoted as C for short), and an interaction variable between SSCF and CONNECTION. We maintain the previous set of control variables. The interaction coefficient β 1 determines whether connections influence the dependence of a segment on its own cash-flow. In addition, we decompose the interaction impact of CONNECTION × SSCF in cases when the segment's cash-flow is positive and cases when it is negative. We estimate (dropping subscripts)
where SSCF + (SSCF -) is a interaction variable that takes a value equal to SSCF if SSCF>0 (<0), and zero otherwise. The interaction coefficients β 1 + and β 1 -provide information on which case connections play a major role. Each of these tests is repeated for each specification using firm, industry, and location fixed-effects.
We report the results in Table 4 (in the interest of brevity, we report only the coefficients of the variables of interest and not those of the control variables). Panel A shows that the interaction coefficient β 1 is statistically significant and negative. This result is robust across the two specifications, with similar magnitudes and significance levels. This indicates that the impact of cash-flow shortfalls is lower for segments that exhibit higher degrees of connection. In addition, columns 3 and 4 show that the interaction coefficient β 1 + is negative but statistically not different from zero, while the coefficient β 1 -is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. These results indicate that connections play a role particularly in times when the connected segment has a negative cash-flow shock. We interpret this as evidence that segments run by connected divisional managers are more likely to be 'protected' during bad times and hence not see their investment allocations decreased.
To which extent does connection affect the investment sensitivity to the cash-flow of other where OSCF+ (OSCF-) is a interaction variable that takes a value equal to OSCF if OSCF>0 (<0), and zero otherwise. These two variables are interacted with CONNECTION, with parameters respectively β 2 + and β 2 -. The results show that in general, segment investment is sensitive to cash-flow generated by the other segments of the firm, irrespective of whether these are positive or negative (both coefficients γ + and γ -are positive and statistically significant). In contrast, segments with connections are more sensitive to the cash-flows of other segments in times when the latter are doing well. The coefficient β 2 + is positive and significant at the 5% level, while the coefficient β 2 -is slightly negative but not statistically different from zero. We interpret this result as indicative that connected segments are more likely to 'receive' allocations when the remaining of the firm is enjoying good times. 
where the interaction variables OSCFc + and OSCFc -are variables that take a value equal to OSCF if SSCF is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. That is, these variables breakdown the cash-flows of the rest of the firm in two components, conditional on whether the segment i itself is performing well. The results show that, in the case of connected segments, the increased sensitivity of segment investment to the cash-flow of other segments is especially strong in the cases in which the segment is performing badly. The coefficient β 3 + is positive and significant at the 10% level, while the coefficient β 3 -is positive but larger, and significant at the 5% level. In other words, a connected segment tends to be sensitive to the cash-flow generated by the other segments, but more so if the segment is enduring bad times.
To summarize, we find that connectedness of managers of a segment tends to decrease the impact of the segment's cash-flow shortfalls on its investment allocation. This decrease is particularly important when the segment is going through 'bad times'. In addition, segments run by connected managers are more dependent on other segments' cash-flow, and particularly so when facing cash-flow shortfalls.
IV. The Connection Gap and Firm Performance
As a next step, we study the impact on firm value. The trust hypothesis posits that the presence of trust between the CEO and the managers of good segments should increase value, while no value creation is expected in the case of the bargaining hypothesis. We therefore first build a proxy for the relative position of connected managers at the top of good and bad segments. We then we study whether connectedness affects transfers across segments and look at the value implications at the firm level.
A. CONNECTION GAP
We want to see how connections affect the investment allocation process as a function of the relative attractiveness of the connected segments. We define a new variable, the CONNECTION GAP, which is the difference between HIGH Q SEGMENT CONNECTION and LOW Q SEGMENT CONNECTION: The CONNECTION GAP measures the extent to which segments with valuable investment opportunities are run by managers more trusted by the CEO relative to segments with weak investment opportunities. In other words, a positive value of the CONNECTION GAP means that High Q segments enjoy higher connections to the CEO relative to Low Q segments.
Given that the impact on the firm of the differences in connection between the two groups may not be symmetric, we allow the CONNECTION GAP to have a differential impact on firm investment allocation and performance depending on who is connected. Hence we divide the CONNECTION GAP into two variables: CONNECTION GAP + is equal to the difference between HIGH Q SEGMENT CONNECTION and LOW Q SEGMENT CONNECTION when this difference is positive, and zero otherwise; CONNECTION GAP -is equal to the negative of the difference between HIGH Q SEGMENT CONNECTION and LOW Q SEGMENT CONNECTION when this difference is negative, and zero otherwise.
The switch of the sign of CONNECTION GAP -allows a direct, intuitive interpretation of the coefficients. We can now investigate the role of connections conditional on which type of segment (high or low Q) has managers that share more characteristics with the CEO.
B. CONNECTION GAP and Internal Transfers
We regress the total transfers to Low Q segments on the CONNECTION GAP and a set of control variables:
where T -j,t is the (segment asset-weighted) sum of the transfers to the segments that operate in segments with a Q lower than then the firm overall IMPUTED Q (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) ). The set of control variables is the same as before and it includes the measure of DIVERSITY as defined in Section 24 This is done without any loss in generality since the total TRANSFERS TO HIGH Q SEGMENTS are the symmetric of the total TRANSFERS TO LOW Q SEGMENTS.
2.3. All the specifications contain firm-fixed effects, industry dummies, location dummies, and timeclustered robust standard errors.
The results are reported in Table 5 
C. CONNECTION GAP and Excess Value
To test how connections affect firm value, we regress the firm's excess value on the CONNECTION GAP and a set of control variables, where EXCESS VALUE (XV j,t ) is the difference between the firm's Q and Imputed Q. 26 We report the results in Table 6 . First, consistently with the trust hypothesis, we find a strong positive correlation between CONNECTION GAP + and firm value, statistically significant at the 5%
level. An increase of one standard deviation in CONNECTION GAP + within the firm corresponds to a 2.5% absolute decrease in the average conglomerate discount, equivalent to a 13% decrease for excess value. 27 The coefficient of CONNECTION GAP -is positive and sizeable, but not statistically significant. This latter finding indicates that trust between the CEO and the division managers of low-Q segments could also play a role in reducing the waste of resources, but, consistent with the Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) intuition, the misallocation problem originates from shirking on the high-Q, not the low-Q, divisions. Hence the marginal impact of connections is higher for high-Q divisions.
Second, we note that the average level of CONNECTION of the firm has a positive but statistically insignificant impact on firm value. This result implies that it is the relative amount of connections between diverse segments that matter for value, not the absolute amount. Indeed if the average level of CONNECTION would matter, commonality could be proxying for better information flows within the conglomerate and an associated positive impact on firm value (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994; Stein, 1997) . Finally, FIRM SIZE and LONG-TERM DEBT are negatively related to excess value, the latter result in line with Mansi and Reeb (2002) . Interestingly, firms with a larger fraction of managers coming from an Ivy League school also exhibit lower conglomerate discounts.
Important in our story is the fact that DIVERSITY plays a mediating role on the impact of connections. The higher the difference across segment investment opportunities, the more likely that a wasteful allocation of resources is needed to prevent the managers at the top of the most productive segments from engaging in shirking (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) ). If trust reduces the need for such value reducing activity, we expect that the positive value impact of connections should be detectable only for firms with a high degree of DIVERSITY. Therefore, the interaction between the degree of diversity of the firm's investment opportunities and CONNECTION GAP should be significant only for firms with a high degree of DIVERSITY.
In columns 3 and 4 of Villalonga (2004) . In a previous draft, we used also a second definition based on Lang and Stulz (1994) . Results are exactly similar and available upon request. 27 The standard deviation of CONNECTION GAP + is 2.8%. Hence 2.8% × 0.912 = 0.025 or 0.025/0.19 of the average conglomerate discount reported in Table 1. is positive and statistically significant. Surprisingly, the interaction term respecting to CONNECTION GAP -is also statistically significant, even if the CONNECTION GAP + interaction term is economically and statistically stronger. We interpret these results as saying that, in firms characterized by widely diverse segments, connections play an important role in mitigating the drawbacks of the conglomerate form.
D. Discussion
Overall, the evidence presented in this section and in the previous one is consistent with the trust hypothesis. The bargaining hypothesis would predict that rent-seeking always leads to misallocation of resources, irrespective of the individual divisions' prospects. Hence the positive relation between commonality and value cannot be fully explained by bargaining. The results do not seem to be due to the fact that connected managers might be employees of higher ability. First, we control for the characteristics of divisional managers as well as the degree of commonality among them (excluding the CEO). Secondly, ability would imply that connection of low-Q segments would also improve firm value, which we do not observe (the interaction coefficient of CONNECTION GAP -is positive but not statistically significant). Hence manager ability cannot also completely explain our results. The fact that connections have a positive impact on firm value if they are present in those divisions that are more liable to shirk ex-ante (the high-Q divisions) indicates that connections function as a trust-building mechanism that alleviates the need for inefficient misallocation of resources.
V. Controlling for Potential Endogeneity
The previous results are subject to the objection that connections between the CEO and divisional managers might be endogenous if CEOs appoint connected managers (that is, members of their social network) to the helm of the best and/or bigger segments. To address this issue, we adopt an instrumental variables approach.
A. Instrumental Variables Related To Segment Geographical Location
To instrument the connection variables, we need a set of exogenous variables that explain the CEO's appointment decision of a divisional manager but that are unrelated to the company's or the segment's performance.
We choose to use variables related to the weather conditions of the area in which the segments are located. Our assumption is that when a CEO is considering filling a position within the organization, he/she will (all else equal) appoint people he/she is familiar with to locations that have a higher quality of living. To the extent that climate conditions affect quality of life, they should affect appointment decisions while being uncorrelated with investment opportunities in a particular location.
We therefore collect a set of weather measures such as the degree of humidity, the wind speed, and the number of sunshine days in the year and aggregate them into a weather index variable. 28 We augment this set of instruments with a dummy taking the value of 1 is the regional headquarters is located in a remote city and zero otherwise. 29 The working hypothesis is that managers would prefer to live closer to big cities. In the case of firm-level regressions, we instrument the difference in connections between good and bad segments with the average differences in climate characteristics of the areas in which the segments are located.
Regarding the quality of the instruments, unreported regressions show a strong correlation between segment connections and climate characteristics. 30 Moreover for each regression the Hansen's J test of over-identification is reported, providing evidence of the lack of residual correlation of the instruments with the second-stage residuals. All regression specifications contain year, industry and geographical location dummies.
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We re-do our most important tests, which are reported in humidity and wind speed, we use the absolute difference with respect to the countrywide average across all locations. The working hypothesis is that managers would prefer to go to areas in which the weather conditions are milder. 29 We define as remote a city that is more than 100 km miles away from one of the top 20 most populated cities in the US. 30 The F-statistic values of regressions of Firm CONNECTION or the CONNECTION GAP on the instrument set range from 19 to 26, therefore above the rule-of-thumb of a F-statistic of 10 as an indicator of weak instruments. 31 Unfortunately our large sample makes it extremely cumbersome (bordering on impossible) to run a fixed-effects IV. We therefore opted for a standard IV with time and industry dummies and standard errors clustered by firm.
Overall, we conclude that the evidence goes in favor of a relation between connections and investment, and between CONNECTION GAP and firm value, that is not due to endogeneity-induced spurious correlation.
VI. Conclusion
We study the role of commonalities between the CEO and divisional managers on the resource allocation process. We focus on connections relate to similar age group, generation within the firm (time of joining, or time of promotion to current position), and similar career and educational background.
We show that the segments run by connected managers receive more investment and exhibit lower sensitivity to their own cash short-falls (and more sensitivity to the other segments' cash-flow) during bad times. At the firm-level, when high-Q divisions are run by connected managers, fewer resources are transferred to low productivity segments, and the conglomerate discount is lower. This impact is stronger in the case the pressure for a "socialistic" allocation is higher, that is, firms characterized by higher diversity in investment opportunities across divisions. These results are not the result of endogenous spurious correlation, and they are independent of the average level of ability of the managers in question.
We argue that these findings are consistent with the notion that commonality induces trust between the CEO and divisional managers, alleviating the commitment problem pointed out by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) in their model of the internal capital market. Our findings contribute to the literature on internal capital markets, the literature on the theory of the firm, and also complement the emerging literature on the role of influence and trust among economic agents.
Appendix The merge of the datasets
To construct our proxy of connection between the CEO and the divisional-managers, we aggregate data from several sources. The first source is the result of the merge of the annual CRSP-Compustat Merged (CCM) database files containing firm-level accounting data, and the Compustat Segment files. of the segment and of the subsidiary; 3-digit SIC code of the segment and of the subsidiary; a keyword match between the segment's Compustat name and the subsidiary's D&B name and business description. We repeat these two matching procedures iteratively after checking manually for unaccounted parent-subsidiary relationships, unmatched large firms due to differences in designation,
etc. The quality of the matching is very good: matching subsidiaries were found for 47% of the total number of Compustat segments, representing 60% of segment asset value. Out of the remaining, about 26% of the number of segments were "unusable" (they refer to corporate headquarters, have missing or zero sales, or have missing segment SIC codes); 11% refer to companies with no information in D&B;
and 17% of segments could not be matched due to ambiguous or missing segment business descriptions.
In terms of asset value, these numbers are 32%, 0% and 9% respectively.
The second step of the merge links D&B manager biography information to Compustat segments.
We consider that a manager exhibits "biographical data" if we have at least information on his year of birth and year of joining the company. Some remarks. First, it is sometimes the case that the headquarters themselves are allocated to a given segment if there is evidence that the segment's operations are effectively taking place at the headquarters. This evidence is usually given by a large number of employees working at the headquarters' location as well as a perfect match between the segment and the headquarters SIC code.
Secondly, it is sometimes the case that the CEO is referred to as part of the management team of the subsidiary. These cases are obviously not taken into account when calculating the pairwise comparisons.
This diminishes our sample somewhat (by about one-fifth) because there are many cases in D&B where the subsidiary only contains info about the (Ultimate Parent) CEO in its manager biography section. 
where Nj is the set of segments belonging to firm j, w i,j is the weight of segment i on the firm j total assets, and Q i ss is the average Q of all single-segment firms in segment i's SIC code. EXCESS VALUE is the difference between the firm's Q and Imputed Q. DIVERSITY (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000) is defined as
where we used the shorthand N j to denote the number of segments of firm j. LONG-TERM DEBT and CASH are respectively, long-term liabilities (item 9) and cash (item 1) over total assets. FIRM AGE is the number of years since the company entered the CRSP database. The WEIGHT OF HIGH Q (LOW Q) SEGMENTS is the sum of weights w i,j for segments that have 
TRANSFER
where I i,j refers to SEGMENT INVESTMENT and A i,j to the segment's assets. TRANSFER (at the firm level) is the segment asset-weighted sum of the Transfers to High Q and Low Q segments. CONNECTION (at the segment level) is the segment average of the four CONNECTION variables, described as follows. CONNECTION BY TIME OF JOINING (at the segment level) is the proportion of CEO-Subsidiary manager pairs in a given segment for which the CEO and the manager entered the firm within 2 years of each other. CONNECTION BY AGE COHORT (at the segment level) is the proportion of CEOSubsidiary manager pairs for which the CEO's and the manager's age are within 4 years of each other. CONNECTION BY TIME OF APPOINTMENT (at the segment level) is the proportion of pairs for which the CEO and the manager reached their current management position within 2 years of each other. CONNECTION BY SAME CAREER/EDUCATION (at the segment level) is the proportion of pairs for which the CEO and the manager have a similar career or educational background (see text for details). Firm-level CONNECTION is the asset-weighted average CONNECTION of the firm's segments. CONNECTION OF HIGH Q (LOW Q) SEGMENTS is the average CONNECTION of segments that have Q i ss above (below) Imputed Q. Same segment cash-flow (SSCF) is segment i's cash-flow divided by firm beginning-of-period total assets. Other segment cash-flow (OSCF) is sum of cashflow accruing to all segments apart from segment i, again divided by beginning-ofperiod total assets. NUMBER OF SUBSIDIARIES is the number of D&B subsidiaries matched to a given Compustat segment. NUMBER OF MANAGERS is the number of managers identified in the D&B database and matched to a given segment; it is therefore the denominator over which all the Connection pairings were summed. This table presents 
where I i,j refers to segment investment and A i,j to the segment's assets. The right-hand side variables can be described as follows. Same segment cash-flow (SSCF) is segment i's cash-flow divided by beginning-of-period firm assets. Other segment cash-flow (OSCF) is the total cash-flow accruing to all segments of the firm apart from segment i, divided by beginning-ofperiod total assets. SEGMENT Q is the average Q of all single-segment firms in segment i's SIC code, where Q is the ratio between market value and book value of assets (e.g. Villalonga, 2004) . The numerator (Fama and French, 2002 ) is equal to liabilities (item 181) minus deferred taxes and investment credit (item 35) plus preferred stock (item 10, or 56, or 130, in that order) plus market value of equity (item 25 times item 199). The denominator is total assets (item 6). Weight of Segment is the weight of segment i on the firm's total assets. LOG SALES is the natural logarithm of Computat sales (data item 12). SALES GROWTH is the percentage growth in sales from the past year. CONNECTION is the segment average of the four individual CONNECTION variables: CONNECTION BY TIME OF JOINING (the proportion of CEO-Subsidiary manager pairs in a given segment for which the CEO and the manager entered the firm within 2 years of each other); CONNECTION BY AGE COHORT (the proportion of CEO-Subsidiary manager pairs for which the CEO's and the manager's age are within 4 years of each other); CONNECTION BY TIME OF APPOINTMENT (the proportion of pairs for which the CEO and the manager reached their current management position within 2 years of each other); and CONNECTION BY SAME CAREER/EDUCATION (the proportion of pairs for which the CEO and the manager have a similar career or educational background). FIRM AGE is the number of years since the company entered the CRSP database. DIVERSITY (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000) is defined as where Nj is the set of segments belonging to firm j, w i,j is the weight of segment i on the firm j total assets, and Q i ss is the average Q of all single-segment firms in segment i's SIC code. LONG-TERM DEBT and CASH are respectively, long-term liabilities (item 9) and cash (item 1) over total assets. NUMBER OF SEGMENTS is the number of business lines reported in Compustat segment data. Ability controls are meant to control for education and specific career background of managers. ABILITY BY ENGINEERING/MARKETING/FINANCE CAREER is the proportion of subsidiary managers in a given segment for which the manager has respectively an Engineering/Marketing/Finance background. ABILITY BY MBA/PHD is the proportion of subsidiary manager that have an MBA or a PhD degree. ABILITY BY IVY LEAGUE is the proportion of subsidiary manager having a degree from an Ivy League University. INTRA-MANAGER CONNECTIONS are calculated in a similar way as the original CONNECTION variables, with the difference that the proportion is calculated over the number of possible pairs between managers of a segment (therefore excluding the CEO). All specifications contain industry dummies, geographical location (state) dummies, and firm fixed effects. T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered (by year) standard errors. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. This table presents least-squares estimates of the relation between SEGMENT INVESTMENT and the four individual CONNECTION variables: CONNECTION BY TIME OF JOINING (the proportion of CEO-Subsidiary manager pairs in a given segment for which the CEO and the manager entered the firm within 2 years of each other); CONNECTION BY AGE COHORT (the proportion of CEO-Subsidiary manager pairs for which the CEO's and the manager's age are within 4 years of each other); CONNECTION BY TIME OF APPOINTMENT (the proportion of pairs for which the CEO and the manager reached their current management position within 2 years of each other); and CONNECTION BY SAME CAREER/EDUCATION (the proportion of pairs for which the CEO and the manager have a similar career or educational background). The left-hand side is segment investment normalized by beginning-of-period firm assets. Right-hand side variables are similar to the ones used in Table 2 (please refer to its caption for a complete description of all the control variables). All specifications contain industry dummies, geographical location dummies, and firm fixed effects. T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered (by year) standard errors. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. where I i,j refers to segment investment and A j is the firm beginning-of-period total assets. CONNECTION GAP is the difference in the average Connection between High Q and Low Q segments. CONNECTION GAP + (CONNECTION GAP -) is equal to the (negative of the) difference in the average CONNECTION of High Q and Low Q segments when this difference is positive (negative), and zero otherwise. All specifications contain industry dummies, geographical location dummies, and firmfixed effects. T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered (by year) standard errors. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Tables 1 and 2 . The symbols ***,**,* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. All specifications contain industry dummies, geographical location dummies, and firm-fixed effects. T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered (by year) standard errors. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. Tables 2   and 6 . The Firm CONNECTION and CONNECTION GAP variables are instrumented using variables that represent the average climate conditions. These climatic conditions are: the degree of humidity (defined as the absolute deviation of the average yearly humidity level with respect to the average across the US); the wind speed (defined as the absolute deviation of the average wind speed with respect to the average across the US); the percentage number of sunshine days in the year. These climate characteristics, which are either at the major county level, are not available for all possible locations (hence there is a small discrepancy between the number of observations of this column and that of Tables 2 and 6). The climate characteristics are averaged across the locations that are part of High Q and Low Q segments. We also include in the instrument set the High Q and Low Q proportion of locations based on remote cities, defined as locations that are more than 100 km away from a major city. All specifications contain industry dummies and geographical location dummies. T-statistics are calculated using robust clustered (by firm × year) standard errors. The symbols ***,**,* denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero. 
